I. Introduction
The almost total impunity for war crimes and grave human rights violations, be it in the former Yugoslavia or in States of less public interest like Columbia or Peru, Togo or Liberia -to mention only a few -has led to calls for the further development of mechanisms of international criminal justice. Efforts in this direction, 1 dating from the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crime trials, experienced an unexpected political push with the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 2 and Rwanda 3 . Recently, codification efforts
Establishing an International Criminal Court and an International Criminal Code procedural and administrative issues; 8 at its 2nd session in August 1996 it took into account the Draft Code 1996 and dealt with further procedural and organizational questions regarding the establishment of an ICC. 9 In a parallel development, an independent committee of experts met to work on an alternative draft to the ILC-Draft Statute in June of 1995 in Siracusa, Italy ('Alternative-Draft'). 10 This Alternative Draft was later amended by a Draft General Part, containing in 21 articles the most relevant criminal law provisions of a general part. 11 Many of these proposals have been adopted by the PrepCom 12 and have influenced the Draft Code 1996. The diagram set out at the end of this article gives an overview of the most important procedural provisions of the Yugoslavia Statute, the BLC Draft Statute and the Alternative Draft.
The following observations intend to give an overview over some procedural and substantive problems of the aforementioned statutes and the Draft Codes 1991 and 1996. Given the limited length of this article and the number of provisions to be considered it was not possible to examine all problems as thoroughly as is necessary. However, it is hoped that the bibliographical references will encourage the reader to research further.
II. The Procedural Level: Observations on an ICC

A. Legal Basis and Jurisdiction
A legal basis of an ICC can, in principle, be established in two different ways: by an international treaty or by a Security Council (SC) resolution. The advantage of the latter model, employed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is evident. It allows the establishment of an ICC as a subsidiary organ of the SC with the approval of only nine of the 15 members of the SC, including the five permanent members (article 27 III UNCharter). 13 Therefore, there is no need for long treaty negotiations or countless substantive compromises 14 . However, in spite of this rather practical argument, the legal basis of such a tribunal is questionable from a public international law viewpoint. 15 Although it can certainly be argued that in the case of grave human rights violations an international right and even duty to prosecute exists (which can be implemented against the will of the affected State if this State is not willing to prosecute seriously) 16 , an ICC's legitimacy depends heavily upon the acceptance of its jurisdiction by as many States as possible. This, in turn, is a prerequisite of global acceptance and effective implementation of its sentences. Against this background, the SC model appears to be a kind of coercive measure that can only be justified in exceptional cases which call for an ad hoc jurisdiction in order to satisfy an internationally recognized need for action (as in the case of the former Yugoslavia) or the demand of a new government (as in Rwanda). In fact, in such a situation the establishment of an International ad-hoc Tribunal can be based on chapter VII of the UN Charter with quite convincing arguments. 17 The treaty model, on the other hand, does not hinder the establishment of an ICC as an organ of the UN, but rather -and this is the important difference -requires that the ICC will be established as a main 18 Given the recent comments of the government delegations in the UN ad hoc Committee, it seems to be clear that an ICC will be established as an 'independent judicial organ by means of a multilateral treaty'.
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Secondly, the question of the subject matter jurisdiction of an ICC arises. Should only those crimes which are 'beyond any doubt part of customary law' 20 -as in the SC statutes and to some extent the ILC-and Alternative Drafts (Art. 20 para. 1) -be included or all crimes or offences codified in international instruments? 21 It is clear that there is a relationship of inverse proportion between the number of included acts and the number of assenting States: the more punishable conducts included in the jurisdiction, the fewer the States that will be willing to accept jurisdiction. 22 This problem can be reduced by referring all crimes that are (only) recognized by treaty to an ad hoc jurisdiction with the consequence that the parties to the statute can still decide whether they are willing to accept an ICC's jurisdiction on a case by case basis. The more important exclusive (original/inherent) jurisdiction implying an ipso facto acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction with the act of becoming party to the statute should be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. This is the position of the ILC 23 and the majority of States involved in the current debate. 24 It is a practical compromise between the politically feasible short-term and legally desirable long-term objective: 'We can start with the establishment of a court with a modest jurisdictional scope, provided that it can one day ripen into the type of universal court many of us hope for' P^ The ad hoc jurisdiction would have the function of gaining the confidence of States and of convincing them 18 This certainly requires an amendment of the UN-Charter (Jaenicke, on Art. 7, marginal notes If., in Simma, supra note 13; Schutte, supra note 2, at 447). Kai Ambos of the necessity of an ICC in order to bring about the general acceptance of its jurisdiction in the long run.
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However, a mere reference to international treaty instruments is not convincing and entails the risk of trivializing the role of the court. 27 This method, the so called 'treaty-approach', leads to contradictions if the treaty character of a particular crime is taken as the sole or decisive indicia of its importance. There are crimes which are virtually unrecognized by the State community in spite of their codification in international treaties, for example mercenarism. Or there are treaty crimes, whose wrongfulness is less than that of other non-treaty crimes, which are nevertheless recognized by customary international law. In spite of this fact, these non-treaty crimes do not -according to the treaty approach -fall within the jurisdiction of an ICC. Bassiouni, for example, includes within the jurisdiction relatively minor and practically irrelevant treaty 'crimes' such as 'offences against international civil maritime navigation', 'drug offences' 28 , and 'international traffic in obscene materials' but does not include extra-legal executions and disappearances. 29 The mere formal argument that for the latter crimes treaties do not exist is unconvincing as the scope and gravity of these crimes make them part of customary international law subject to duties of prosecution and punishment. 30 Moreover, offenses codified in international instruments are frequently too vague to be directly applicable in national law; therefore, they require an internal process of transformation. 31 If one wants to include all internationally recognized crimes one should not limit this exercise to universal treaties. Instead, it is much more consistent to extend subject matter jurisdiction only to those crimes whose recognition by general international law, including customary law, is beyond question -irrespective of their codification in international instruments. 32 This approach does not imply a qualitative 'less' compared to the quanta- 37 The very question is in which cases an ICC should 'complement' the national jurisdiction, or, to use the words of the ILC: when is a trial procedure not 'available' or 'ineffective'? The question is closely linked to the subject matter jurisdiction of an ICC and to the role national jurisdiction can play in a given case. Taking seriously complementarity implies in principle the limitation of the ICCs jurisdiction to a few 'hard core' crimes. 38 In these cases, the ICC's intervention depends on the functioning of the national criminal justice system concerned. If it is not functioning at all, i.e. neither the capacity nor the will to investigate seriously exist, the ICC's jurisdiction is compelling. If it functions in principle, i.e. more or less serious investigations are initiated, the difficult question arises where to draw the line between a sufficient and insufficient seriousness, the latter literally forcing the ICC to claim jurisdiction. The ELC's commentary to the preamble envisages a very high threshold stating that 'it is intended to operate in cases where there is no prospect of ... persons duly tried in national courts'. 39 The States themselves only point out that 'the intervention of the court in situations where an operating national judicial system was being used as a shield required very careful consideration'. 40 It clearly follows from that that we have to deal with a complementary or 'supplemental' ICC 41 , whatever the exact meaning is.
B. Procedural and Other Rules 42
The procedural rules are accusatorial as the prosecutorial organ investigates and prepares the accusation. The tribunal intervenes in a kind of intermediate procedure at latest after the filing of die accusation; it can confirm, refuse or modify the accusation. In a treaty model the question arises whether the SC itself, independent of a member State, can initiate proceedings on the basis of a measure under chapter VII of die UN-Charter. 43 One may be skeptical of the legitimacy of such an action, but ultimately it cannot be totally excluded if one wants to avoid the parallel creation of ad hoc tribunals by the SC in cases where the SC does not feel that its interests are being sufficiently taken into account by die ICC. 44 The question does also play a role for the further proceedings since -at least according to the ILC Draft (Art. 23 par. 3) -a prosecution arising from a situation being dealt with by the SC under chapter VII may not be commenced without die SC's prior authorization. Generally speaking, die crucial issue is to find die right balance between die necessary independence of an ICC and die primary role of die SC in die maintenance of international peace and security. States have particulary criticized die SC's exclusive exercise of jurisdiction in die case of agression (Art. 23 par. 2 ILC Draft).
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In all other cases die prosecutor must prove that diere is a prima facie case, and die tribunal must determine die admissibility of die accusation. However, die ELC does not provide a definition of a prima facie case. It must be remembered that die mere accusation represents an important interference in the rights of die affected persons; for diat reason, a prima facie case should be interpreted restrictively. Righdy, dierefore, die Alternative Draft defines it as 'a credible case which wouldif not contradicted by die defence -be a sufficient basis to convict die accused' (Art. 27 para. 2). This definition is similar to die so-called strong suspicion of a criminal offence (dringender Tatverdacht) employed by die German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozefiordnung) as a requirement for an accusation (Anklage).
Art. 37 para. 4 DLC-Draft further provides for die establishment of a special 'indictment chamber' which, however, does not appear in die provisions about die chambers (Art 9). The function of diis chamber is to carry out a written evidentiary procedure or evaluation. The resulting 'record of evidence' can be used in a subse- The order of the trial phase is of similar importance. Reading of the indictment and the statement as well as the personal and substantive examination of the accused should take place before the evidence is heard. The presence of the accused is quite significant for his defence. Different solutions are possible. The H.C Draft and -in a more restricted way -the Alternative Draft permit a trial in absentia (Art 37 para. 2) 47 ; not so the statutes for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. For practical reasons, a trial in absentia cannot be absolutely prohibited, although political and legal criticism of such trials has to be taken seriously. 48 In any case, exceptions should only be permitted in clearly specified circumstances. The proper role of the tribunal -quite active as in a mixed instructorial (instruktorisch) system or passive as in a pure adversarial system -is a matter for discussion. 49 Ultimately, a combination of the two dominant systems -the Anglo-American adversarial and the continental mixed systems -should be reached.
All statutes separate the actual judgement -concerning the guilt of the accusedfrom the sentencing phase. Those in favour of such a separation contend that it prevents the tribunal -normally a jury -deciding on the question of guilt from being improperly influenced by information about the personal circumstances of the accused (information that is only necessary for sentencing purposes); however, there is no jury in an ICC, and it cannot seriously be claimed that no information regarding the personal circumstances of the accused will reach the judges of an international tribunal nor that such judges are immune to improper influence. Therefore, the division of the trial into two phases seems to be unnecessary.
Given the lack of international norms with respect to the scope of penalties one must refer to national law. 30 It is highly unlikely that there are international stan- This is evident if, as in the Yugoslavian case, the affected State has transformed the applicable international treaties in its national law and has provided for corresponding sentencing guidelines. However, it is unfortunate that the statute does not refer to these sentencing guidelines but only to the general practice (Oellers-Frahm, supra note 2, at 427).
Kai Ambos dards at all. Therefore, a mere reference to imprisonment or fine as types of penalties (cf. Art. 47 ILC-draft) without specifying the length or amount could conflict with the nulla poena principle. 51 In this context, the general question of the applicable law arises. There will only be a satisfactory solution if the applicable law in an individual case is either linked to the corresponding jurisdiction in that case or the statute itself clearly determines the applicable law. The SC has ignored these questions in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. The ILC-Draft has addressed it, but in an unsatisfactory fashion. It is far from clear to refer to 'this Statute; applicable treaties and the principles and rules of general international law' (Art. 33 a), b) 
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The reference to national release or mitigation provisions implies the danger of the circumvention of sentences imposed by the ICC. Therefore, limitations derived from international law should be included in the statute. An absolute remission of a sentence in the case of grave human rights violations cannot be permitted. 55 In any event, decisions granting partial exemption from punishment should, if at all, be taken only by the ICC itself.
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Despite the theoretical and technical implications of all these problems one should not overlook that the central issue of any procedural system is of a criminal policy 51 The Alternative Draft, supra note 10, at least provides for a minimum sentence of not less than one year and an appropiate fine. See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 7, par. Establishing an International Criminal Court and an International Criminal Code nature: to guarantee a proper balance between the rights of the suspect or the accused and the effectiveness of the prosecution. Fortunately, it seems to be a consensus among the States involved in the debate that this balance has to be ensured. 59 The subjective elements are now included in the individual responsibility provision establishing that an individual is responsible if he or she 'intentionally commits such a crime' [Art. 2 par. 3 (a)]. This means that responsibility presupposes at least a general intent bearing in mind that certain crimes require special intent (esp. genocide). However, there still remains some doubt as Art. 2 includes all possible objective conducts constituting a crime (ordering the commission, ommission, aiding, abetting, direct participation, incitement, attempt) without making clear whether such a conduct also requires mens rea. Given that there was consensus within the ILC that mens rea is a necessary element of a crime and disagreement existed only if this had to be expressed explicitly, one might argue that the mens rea requirement is selfevident. Indeed, some members of the ILC consider subjective elements to be an inherent part of international crimes and therefore do not see the need for an explicit norm, whereas others wanted to have it included explicitly in the norm regulating . 33-7) .
In the field of defences it is striking that the questions related to superior order and command responsibility require three articles (Art. 5-7) whereas other defences are not even mentioned. This is partly due to the practical experience from the Nazi war crime trials which clearly showed that superior order is the most important defence. 61 Other defences have neither been recognized by the Statute of the International Military Tribunal (hereinafter IMT Statute) nor by succeeding international instruments. 62 Thus, legal history provides a strong argument in favour of leaving it to the Court to determine the admissibility of a defence 'in accordance with the general principles of law, in the light of the character of each crime' (Art. 14 Draft Code). It is clear that defence counsel will -as they did in Nuremberg and the following trials -put forward defences known from national law. Then the Court will have to decide on the general validity and concrete applicability of the defence. The ILC, albeit not mentioning them in the draft, has four defences in mind: selfdefence, duress or coercion, mistake of fact and age of the offender.
63
The final division between defences (Art. 14) and extenuating circumstances (Art. 15) -introduced due to widespread criticism of the old provision mixing the two concepts 64 -takes into account that the grounds for justification belong to the constituting elements of a crime while the grounds for mitigation should be considered within the framework of sentencing. A further separation within the defences (in relation to justification and excuse) 65 . 12 par. 3) . This provision, however, applies only to an ICC. 83 Therefore, it remains unclear whether national courts initiating second proceedings according to Art. 12 par. 2 (b) must also take into account periods of imprisonment already served. The position of the accused is -due to the uncertainty in this area -extremely vulnerable. Finally, all these reflections assume the existence of an ICC. In the absence of an ICC the status of the ne bis in idem principle is unclean so many States fail to recognize it that it cannot claim universal validity. 84 In cases of possible multiple prosecution, sufficient protection of the accused can only be achieved if the affected States agree on a diplomatic level -upon initiation of an investigation -where the trial should take place and where the eventual sentence should be executed. 85 An international Code, therefore, should contain an obligation to bilateral consultations in order to avoid double sentencing; a detailed regulation of the ne bis in idem principle can be left to the statute of an ICC. perpetrators of international crimes -with the exception of aggression -independently of an ICC (Art. 8 Draft Code 1996). If they do not prosecute they must extradite to another State claiming jurisdiction (Art 9, aut dedere out judicare); however, this does not cover the transfer or surrender to an ICC. 86 The Draft Code may serve as a legal basis for extradition (Art. 10 par. 2).
B. Special Part
As mentioned above, the Draft Code still does not give a precise definition of a crime but refers to the crimes regulated in the special part. The substantial reduction of the crimes from twelve to five (aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against UN and associated personnel, war crimes) 87 is a response to widespread criticism as indicated by the Special Rapporteur:
... the Special Rapporteur is proposing a more restricted list ... This is what the vast majority of Governments want. In order for an international wrongful act to become a crime under the code, not only must it be extremely serious but the international community must decide that it is to be included.
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The substantive criteria for this reduction are that the crime, one die one hand, be recognized by existing customary international law and, on the other hand, mat it entails a threat to international peace and security. As to the latter criterion, two of the crimes, aggression and genocide, by their very nature pose such a threat to the international community. The remaining three crimes (crimes against humanity, crimes against UN and associated personnel, war crimes) are covered only if they meet the additional requirement of having been committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale (cf. Art. 18-20 Draft Code 1996). personnel. 115 The provision is certainly a political signal; one wonders, however, whether there is real need for privileged treatment of UN personnel given that the attacks in question are already covered by the other crimes and UN personnel are in the same position as the civilian population in zones of armed conflict.
FV. Future Perspectives
At the moment, the fate of the statute for an ICC and of an International Criminal Code is difficult to predict The PrepCom was, as mentioned initially, established in order to combine 'further discussions with the drafting of texts, with a view to preparing a consolidated text of a convention for an international criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries'. 116 Its first draft report on 'General Principles of Criminal Law'' 17 combined with the -certainly improved -Draft Code 1996 is a substantial step forward. The PrepCom has now to take into account the Draft Code 1996 and try either to incorporate it in a Statute or clearly seperate substantive and procedural norms. In any case, the substantive criminal law requires some further improvement which -though it is a difficult endeavour to put forward a general part which will be convincing both to common and continental lawyers -should not be impossible. 118 Taken as it is, the Draft Code 1996 could be adopted in the form of a convention by the GA or a States conference, in the form of a declaration by the GA or, as already mentioned, incorporated in the Statute. Although there is no formal agreement on the timing aspect, a States' conference will probably take place in 1998 after three or four more meetings of the PrepCom in 1997. 119 In any case, a more or less solid and convincing general part would require a thorough analysis of the jurisprudence and codification efforts since Nuremberg supported by comparative legal research in order to distill fundamental structural elements of substantive international criminal law. Such research would take time and it might be a political mistake to wait for its results.
Finally, in spite of the euphoria surrounding certain positive political developments, it should not be overlooked that the intemationalisation of criminal law, in particular the creation of mechanisms of international criminal justice, will only meet its expectations if the corresponding competences or even obligations to prosecute certain criminal acts defined as 'international crimes' are internalized, i.e. recognized and accepted by the prosecutors, the accused and the victims, as materi- 
Alternative-draft (1995)
As ILC-draft.
In principle as ILCdraft, but state complaint facilitated and role of theSC discussed (part. III).
In principle as ILCdraft, but exact definition of specific crimes and additional crimes according to annex.
As ILC-draft
As ILC-draft. In case of error of law or fact.
In case of new, decisive facts.
Art. 27,28.
In a certain state according to its law under supervision of the ICC.
Pardon or commutation of sentences subject to the decision of the ICC.
ILC-draft(1994)
Reasons and consequences for appeal and review (Art. 48-50).
In case of unfair trial, error of law or fact (new decision or trial); in case of disproportion between crime and sentence (amendment of the sentence) (Art. 48,49).
Similar to UN-SC resolutions, Presidency requests a decision of the former or new trial chamber or refers the matter to appeals chamber (Art. 50).
Habeas corpus during pre-trial proceedings (Art. 29 par. 3).
Prerequesite: recognition of judgments by state parties (Art. 58).
Similar to UN-SC resolutions, if impossible in 'host state' (Art. 59).
Pardon, parole and commutation of sentences according to national law on request of convicted person at ICC (Art. 60).
Alternative-draft (1995)
Art. 48-50
In principle as ILCdraft, but: error of fact only in case of 'miscarriage of justice' reason for appeal; prosecutor and accused have right to appeal (Art 48).
As ILC-draft and additionally right to appeal against pretrial rulings (Art 48 par. 1).
In principle as ILCdraft, but stronger legal obligation by expression 'abide'.
Additionally to ILC: formal acceptance of the administering state; no consent of the sentenced person; also applicable to fines and confiscatory measures (Art 59).
No release according to national law:, decision by the ICC alone (Art 60)
